THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Trusts-Attorney's Lien for Services in Behalf of Beneficiary Barred by Spendthrift Clauge-[illinois].-The beneficiary of a spendthrift trust was to receive $io,ooo
from the corpus of the trust every five years. The trustee attempted to set off the first
payment against a debt owed the estate by the beneficiary. The latter employed an
attorney to bring suit to prevent the set-off and to obtain the full amount. Since the
beneficiary was indigent, he contracted to compensate his attorney by a contingent fee
of one-third of all amounts recovered. The attorney served the trustee with notice of a
lien under the Attorney's Lien Act., He then instituted a suit which was successful in
establishing the beneficiary's claim. The beneficiary paid the attorney one-third of the
amount received at that time.2 Immediately before the next payment to the beneficiary fell due, the attorney again served notice of the lien on the trustee. The trustee
paid the beneficiary one-half the amount then due and retained the balance until the
beneficiary should request it. When the trustee refused to pay the attorney, the latter
filed a petition to adjudicate his lien. Inasmuch as the beneficiary had died between
the time the payment came due and the bringing of this action, his personal representative intervened to claim the $5,0ooo still in the trustee's possession.3 The trial court
held that the contract applied to one-third of the debt the beneficiary owed to the testator's estate and that the lien was not barred by the spendthrift clause. A judgment
was entered against the trustee individually for one-third of the total amount due the
beneficiary at the time notice of the attorney's lien was last served. On appeal to the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, held, that the attorney's lien operates as
an assignment of the beneficiary's interest which is barred by the spendthrift clause.
Judgment reversed. McKeown v. Pridmore.4
The court's decision conforms to the general rule that a beneficiary's interest in a
spendthrift trust is beyond the reach of his creditors or assignees.s But the Attorney's

zIll. Rev. Stat.

(1941) c. 13, § 14.
The trustee, who obtained a judgment for the sum owed the estate by the beneficiary, had
a sheriff execute the judgment immediately upon the transfer of the $io,ooo payment to the
beneficiary. By a subsequent settlement between the trustee and the beneficiary, $6,168 was
turned over to the latter who paid one-third of this amount to his attorney.
3 The lower court held that the beneficiary's death had no effect on the spendthrift clause
and the trustee was directed to pay $4,000 to the beneficiary's personal representative. The
other $S,ooowas impounded by a court of equity because of an alimony claim made by a divorcee of the beneficiai:y. The appellate court reversed the decision as to the effect of the beneficiary's death and held that the trustee could keep the $4,00o to apply on the beneficiary's
debt to the estate. The appellate court's decision conforms to the generally accepted rule as
to unaccrued payments, but the rule is otherwise in situations where, as in the instant case,
the payment has already accrued. x Scott, Trusts § I58.1 (1939).
4310 Ill. App. 634, 35 N.E. (2d) 376 (1941). The notice of the attorney's lien had been
served on the defendant as trustee and executor; the original complaint was filed against the
defendant, and he was served, in these capacities. Later the complaint was amended to include
the defendant individually but no new service was made. The appellate court indicated that
the defendant should have been served personally and questioned whether the trustee could
be made personally liable upon an attorney's lien against him as trustee and executor. Ibid.,
at 651-52 and 383.
s Com'r v. Blair, 6o F. (2d) 340 (C.C.A. 7th 1932), cert. den. 288 U.S. 602 (1933); Congress
Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N.E. 838 (1924). For a discussion of this rule and statutory changes, see i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 222 (1935); Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts
c. 3 (1936); 1 Scott, Trusts §§ 151-52.1 (I939).
2

RECENT CASES
Lien Act, under which a contingent-fee contract gives rise to an attorney's lien, does
not exempt the interests of cestuis under a spendthrift trust. To hold that an attorney's lien is an assignment barred by a spendthrift clause is to make a private contract
superior to a public statute. 6 Under a similar statute the New York Court of Appeals
held enforceable an attorney's lien for services rendered to protect the beneficiary's
interest despite a spendthrift clause.7
But even apart from the statute, it may be argued that the spendthrift provision
should not be applied. According to the Restatement of Trusts: "Although a trust is
a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the beneficiary can be reached
in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary, (a) by the wife or child
of the beneficiary for support, or by the wife for alimony; (b) for necessary services
rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished to him; (c) for services
rendered and materials furnished which preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary." Although the case law is not dear, courts of equity have made exceptions to
spendthrift clauses for suppliers of necessaries to beneficiaries9 and for the benefit of
dependents of beneficiaries.10
Moreover, in the instant case, the spendthrift clause, which was designed to protect
the beneficiary, actually prevents the latter from asserting his rights under the trust.
When a trustee refuses to pay a beneficiary, the latter's only remedy is a suit in equity
against the trustee. In refusing to enforce the attorney's lien in the instant case, the
court in effect ruled that a spendthrift clause prevents an indigent beneficiary from
suing the trustee, for an attorney will not prosecute such a beneficiary's claim until he
is assured of adequate compensation. He will therefore require a contingent-fee contract unless he is willing to gamble on what the chancellor will allow as a reasonable fee.
Even under the decision in the instant case the spendthrift clause would afford no
basis for an objection to an allowance of reasonable fees by the chancellor. Although it
is doubtful whether the chancellor would charge the attorney's fee against the trust
6Attorney's liens are treated as equitable assignments in Illinois. Lewis v. Braun, 356 Ill.
467, 1x1 N.E. 56 (I934). It has also been held in Illinois that an attorney's lien cannot attach
to property that the client has no authority to dispose of by contract. Coyle v. Velie Motors
Corp., 305 Ill. App. 135, 27 N.E. (2d) 6o (I94O); People v. Holten, 304Ill.394, 136 N.E. 738
(1922). Butcf. Tracy v. Ringole, 87 Cal. App. 549, 262 Pac. 73 (1927) (attorney'slien on an un-

assignable tort claim).
7 Matter of Williams, 187 N.Y. 286, 79 N.E. io9 (1907) (attorney suing for a reasonable
fee, there being no written contract with the beneficiary). But cf. Pond v. Harrison, 96 Kan.
542, 152 Pac. 655 (i915) (mechanic's lien). In Castree v. Shotwell, 73 N.J. Eq. 590, 68 Atl.
774 (igo8), the court refused to charge the beneficiary's interest to pay an attorney for advice
on handling the estate.
9 1 Rest., Trusts § 157 (1935). Statutes with substantially the same provisions have been
enacted in Louisiana and Oklahoma. La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) § 9850.28; Okla. Stat.
(Harlow, Supp. 1942) § 9240(y).
9In re Berrien's Estate, 147 Misc. 788, 264 N.Y. Supp. 593 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Sherman v.
Skuse, z66 N.Y. 345, 59 N.E. 99o (igoi); Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo. App. 387, 129 S.W. 224
(i9io); Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570 (1884); Erisman v. Directors of Poor, 47 Pa. 5o9 (1864).
Contra: Pond v. Harrison, 96 Kan. 542, 152 Pac. 655 (191s).
xoEngland v. England, 223 IM. App. 549 (1922). For discussions concerning the rights of

creditors and dependents, see Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts c. 5 (1936); 1 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 223 (1935); 1 Scott, Trusts §§ 57-57.3 (1939).
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estate or the trustee personally, if this procedure were followed the spendthrift provision would be irrelevant-" If the beneficiary's interest itself were burdened, it could
be argued that the spendthrift clause is designed merely to prohibit assignments (such
as contingent-fee contracts) by the beneficiary himself, not to prevent a court of equity
2
from fixing proper charges upon his interest.1
There seems to be little difference, however, between an attorney's lien based on a
contingent-fee contract and one based on the reasonable value of his services. Under
the decision in the instant case, a beneficiary, in requesting an attorney to prosecute his
claim, offers the latter the chance to obtain an allowance from the chancellor rather than
a fixed percentage of the amount recovered; the assignment, except in form, would be
made by the beneficiary. Furthermore, the reason for restricting the use of the contingent-fee contract-that the contingent fee may take an exorbitant proportion of the
amount recovered-is refuted by the fact that an attorney, who seeks to enforce a lien
based on a contingent-fee contract with his client, must affirmatively show that it is
fair and equitable.13 Indeed, the plaintiff's failure in the instant case to make such
proof may have been an alternative ground for the decision.'4
Workmen's Compensation Acts-Recovery by Compensated Employee from
Third-Party Tortfeasor-[Illinois].-The plaintiff's deceased, a contractor's employee,
was killed through the negligence of the defendant, a truckdriver for a large printing
concern. Both employers were "bound" by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
1"Since a payment from the trust estate for services rendered to protect the interest of one
beneficiary is in effect a gift to that beneficiary in addition to the amounts grantedin the trust
instrument, it is possible that other beneficiaries of the trust could object to such a depletion
of their interests. See 2 Scott, Trusts § 254 (1939). It may be argued, however, that the trustee should be charged personally for expenses incurred by the beneficiary in asserting his interest where the trustee erroneously refused to pay him sums due under the trust. But the trustee's mistake of law-claiming a set-off of debts owed the estate by the beneficiary despite the
spendthrift clause-is probably insufficient to be the basis of personal liability without a right
of reimbursement against the estate. See 2 Scott, Trusts § 201 (1939).
12Notes 9and io supra. In the instant case, the trustee possessed sufficient funds belonging
to the beneficiary to pay the attorney. But if the trustee, after being served with notice of a
valid attorney's lien, had paid the beneficiary his total interestignoring the attorney's lien, and
the beneficiary had failed to pay the attorney, the trustee probably would have been personally
liable to the attorney for the amount of the lien. Cf. Sutton v. Chicago R. Co., 258 Ill. 551,
ioi N.E. 940 (1913); Zazove v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co., 28 Ill. App.
534 (i92o). And he could not have secured reimbursement from the trust estate. 2 Scott,
Trusts § 245 (I939).
'3 Goranson v. Solomonson, 3o4 Ill. App. 8o, 25 N.E. (2d) 930 (i94o); cf. Masterson v.
Wall, 365 Ill.
io2, 6 N.E. (2d) i6i (1936); Berkos v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 Ill. App. 243
(1935).
'4 It had been argued in the lower court that the contract provided that the attorney was
to receive one-third of all subsequent payments to the beneficiary from the corpus of the
trust. The lower court construed it to mean that the attorney should receive one-third of the
debt the beneficiary owed the trust estate. Opinion of the trial court as reported in Brief for
Appellee, McKeown v. Pridmore, at 39, 40-4 i . The appellate court said that the attorney
failed to show that the contract was fair and equitable. McKeown v. Pridmore, 310Ill. App.

634, 647-48, 3s N.E. (2d) 376, 382 (I941).

